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I. INTRODUCTION
In Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the
Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission ("CFTC"), based on application of a deferential
standard of review for administrative agency decisions.1 However,
the court effectively applied the Daubert standard to expert witness
testimony using the science of probability, and, splitting with the
Second Circuit, made illegal freshening transactions conducted in a
competitive market.2
The Seventh Circuit's decision rests on a deferential standard of
review. 3 After analyzing whether the appropriate standard of review
was de novo or deferential, the court could have simply stated that it
had to defer to the CFTC's decision and written a one paragraph
opinion. Instead, the court addressed, as dicta, whether the testimony
of the CFTC's expert witness should and would meet the
requirements of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical, Inc.
4
Although this issue is intriguing, the most captivating element of the
Elliott dicta is that in upholding the CFTC's finding of wrongdoing
in transacting freshening trades and claiming that circumstantial
evidence supported a finding of wash sales, the Seventh Circuit split
with the Second Circuit holding in Stoller v. Commodity Futures
Trading Commission.5 Dicta is persuasive, rather than mandatory
authority, 6 and the Elliott dicta is especially persuasive. The court's
failure to explicitly state that symmetrical freshening trades
conducted by open outcry were illegal wash sales results in
dangerously persuasive, but presently legally toothless, dicta.
1. See Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926 (7th Cir.
2000).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 927.
4. Id. at 933-35 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
589 (1993)).
5. See id. at 939 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (discussing Stoller v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 834 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1987)).
6. JACOBSTEIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 6 (7th ed. 1998).
7. See id. ("It is common for yesterday's dictum to develop into today's
doctrine.").
This paper examines all three issues of the Elliott decision. Part
II concisely explains commodities futures exchanges and key terms
used in this paper. 8 Part III summarizes the procedural history and
facts of Elliott.9 Part IV discusses each of the three issues in Elliott,
that is, standard of review, evidentiary issues, and trading practices;
examining the history, instant opinion, and potential impact of each.'
Part V briefly concludes."
II. BRIEF EXPLANATION OF COMMODITIES FUTURES EXCHANGES
AND KEY TERMS
A commodities futures market is an exchange where traders buy
and sell bi-lateral sales contracts for a specific commodity.1 2  A
"future" is the obligation to buy a certain quantity, called a
"contract," of a specific commodity at a particular future date (e.g.,
December wheat), called the "delivery date."' 13 As the delivery date
approaches, a market morphs from a futures market to a "spot" or
"cash" market.' 4 At this point, contracts holders of the commodity
must accept delivery of the commodity.15 As the market becomes a
cash market, professional futures traders sell contracts to those who
want the actual commodity. For example, a bread company that
wanted actual wheat, not just wheat futures, might buy wheat futures
intending to take delivery. 16 As the spot market emerges, the price of
futures contracts, affected by the changing nature of the market,
becomes more volatile. 17 A professional trader tries to maximize his
8. See infra notes 12-35 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 36-57 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 58-204 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 205-211 and accompanying text.
12. NEW YORK INSTITUTE OF FINANCE, FUTURES: A PERSONAL SEMINAR 4
(1994).
13. Id. at 8.
14. Id. at 4-5.
15. Id. at 83.
16. See id.
17. Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926, 928 (7th
Cir. 2000).
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profits while avoiding taking delivery of the commodity.' 8 The
stakes are high: if the trader is forced to take delivery, he will have to
pay storage space rental fees for each day to store the wheat until he
finds a buyer.' 9
A wash sale, for purposes of securities and commodities futures
trading, 20 is an illegal pre-arranged sale between two or more traders
that results in no aggregate gain or loss of securities or money.
21
Traders who participate in wash sales are rarely subject to any risk,
due to pre-arrangement. 22  Wash sales are illegal because the
collusion between the traders renders the trades noncompetitive.23
Many wash sales are conducted between two or more entities
18. Id.
19. NEW YORK INSTITUTE OF FINANCE, supra note 12, at 83.
20. The term "wash sale" has a different nuance for purposes of tax law due to
the timing of a wash transaction for purposes of tax law. Tax law defines "wash
sale" to mean a purchase and sale of "substantially identical" securities within a
sixty-day period. 26 U.S.C. § 1091 (2001). Wash sales are illegal in securities and
commodities law, but a sale may not be illicit using just the tax law definition. The
broadness of the tax law definition allows for sales that would not be considered
illicit for securities and commodities law purposes because it is entirely possible to
buy and sell the same security in a sixty day period for the same price without pre-
arranging to do so or intending to remove the risk from the transaction.
21. Prohibited Transactions, 6 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(2)(A)(i) (2001) (prohibiting
wash sales explicitly in commodities futures markets). Although wash sales are not
explicitly prohibited in the United States Code relating to securities markets,
numerous cases have found wash sales to be a manipulative trading device. See,
e.g., Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Kimmes, 799 F. Supp. 852, 859 (N.D. Ill.
1992) (citing Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 591 F.2d
588, 595 (10th Cir. 1979) (stating that wash sales are a violation of Section 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2001)); Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 476 (1977) (stating that wash sales are a violation of Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2001) and Rule lOb-5
promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001)).
22. See Reddy v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 191 F.3d 109, 124 (2d
Cir. 1999) (quoting Charles R. P. Pouncy, The Scienter Requirement and Wash
Trading in Commodity Futures: The Knowledge Lost in Knowing, 16 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1625, 1637 n.55 (1995)).
23. See Elliott, 202 F.3d at 938 (citing Stoller v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 834 F.2d 262, 264 (2d Cir. 1987)).
22-2
controlled by the same party.24 The purpose of these trades is to
artificially inflate the trading volume to attract the interest of other
traders.
25
Freshening is a legitimate trading practice used by professional
traders who wish to stay in the futures market during the delivery
month.26 Delivery on futures contracts is on a first-in-first-out basis,
that is, traders who have held their positions longest take first
delivery of the cash commodity. 27 In order to avoid taking delivery
of a cash commodity, traders "freshen" their positions by selling
soon-to-be-delivered cash commodity and buying similar quantities
of later-delivered commodity. 28 .,1
A spread is the difference between two prices. 29 The issues
discussed in this article involved the spread between the price for
which one trader buys (or sells) and another trader sells (or buys).3 °
24. See, e.g., Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Blech, No. 99 CIV. 4770(RWS),
2000 WL 288263, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2000) (announcing that the Security
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filed litigation alleging that the defendant
perpetrated wash sales using controlled accounts); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v.
Vigue, No. 00113-B, Lit. Rel. No. 16,912 (D. Me., settled Feb. 28, 2001) (securing
consent order against investment adviser who engaged in numerous illegal trading
practices, including wash sales, using nominee accounts); Rockies Fund Inc.,
Admin. Proceeding No. 3-9615, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40049, Investment
Company Act Release No. 23,229, 67 S.E.C. Docket 556, at *1 (June 1, 1998)
(alleging that the respondents "inflated the value of the restricted stock ... by
manipulating the market for [a particular] stock by engaging in matched orders and
wash sales or trading through nominee accounts").
25. Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market Based Proposal,
88 CAL. L. REV. 279, 299 n.55 (2000).
26. In re Collins, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)
22,982 at 31,903 n.25 (CFTC Apr. 4, 1986), rev'd on other grounds, Stoller, 834
F.2d at 262 (2d Cir. 1987).
27. Elliott, 202 F.3d at 928 (Cudahy, J.).
28. Id.
29. DOWNES AND GOODMAN, FINANCE AND INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 608 (5th
ed. 1998).
30. Elliott, 202 F.3d at 928. The Elliott opinion describes Petitioners as
"trading spreads." The commodities business definition of "trading spreads"
means to trade two complimentary positions at once so that one position hedges the
other. The two positions are such that one commodity could replace the other. For
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When a market is less liquid, spreads between prices in separate
transactions are smaller.31 No matter how illiquid a market, spreads
are not usually identical in a competitive market.
32
Wheat is traded on most midwestern commodities markets,
including the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT"), the Kansas City
Board of Trade, and the Minneapolis Grain Exchange. 33 A contract
of wheat is five thousand bushels. 34  On the CBOT, wheat is
delivered in July, September, December, March, and May.
35
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS OF ELLIOTT
A. Procedural History
The Division of Enforcement ("Enforcement") of the CFTC
brought an action against Elliott, Maritote, Schaer, and Sion
example, a spread could be buying pork bellies and selling lean hogs, buying corn
and selling wheat, or buying July wheat and selling September wheat. It does not
appear that Petitioners were actually trading spreads, under the term of art
definition. Petitioners were all long on (that is, they bought) wheat. After the
transactions, Petitioners were still long on wheat.
31. Id. at 928-29. Support for this point of the Elliott opinion is particularly
unclear. Numerous sources state that smaller spreads between bid-offer prices
generally indicate a more liquid market. See, e.g., PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE,
Order No. B0-00R6, Michael A. Goldstein, 2000 SWAPs & Other Derivatives in
2000 Energy Commodity Derivatives, 1215 PLI/Corp 483, 487 (2000) ("[T]he
market is deep and liquid . . . and, therefore, multiple quotes . . . will be within a
fairly narrow bid-offer spread .... "). Whether Rooney's assertion as reported in
the Elliott opinion is true, that is, that transaction price spreads, as opposed to bid-
offer price spreads, are small in a less liquid market, is unclear. The Elliott opinion
admits, in dicta, that no statistical evidence supports Rooney's assertion. See
Elliott, 202 F.3d at 934. Increasingly creative termed searches on Westlaw yielded
no support for Rooney's assertion, tending instead to yield information about run
off from fields spread with liquid manure.
32. Id. at 928-29. The idea is logical: in a competitive market, prices
constantly adjust to adapt to most recent supply and demand requirements. In
Elliott, one of the Seventh Circuit's criticisms of the CFTC's case was that no
statistical evidence was presented to support this concept, i.e., no study showing
price movements in competitive markets was presented. Id. at 935.
33. NEW YORK INSTITUTE OF FINANCE, supra note 12, at 9-10.
34. DOWNES AND GOODMAN, supra note 29, at 950-5 1.
35. Id.
22-2
("Petitioners") alleging pre-arranged and noncompetitive trading in
the form of wash sales.36 An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ)
ruled against Enforcement.37 Enforcement appealed to the CFTC,
which is empowered by the Administrative Procedure Act to review
the ALJ's decision de novo making findings of both fact and law.
38
The CFITC found in favor of Enforcement.39 Petitioners appealed the
CFTFC decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, which affirmed the CFTC's decision. n Petitioners then
appealed the circuit court decision to the Supreme Court, which
denied certiorari.4
B. Facts
In late February and early March of 1991, Petitioners, four high-
volume pit traders in wheat futures at the CBOT, made a series of
thirty-two trades:
1. February 25. Elliott sold 1000 March-July spreads
at 21 cents to Maritote. Elliott bought 1000 of the
same spread at the same price--450 from Maritote
and 550 from Sion. Sion got his 550 from
Maritote, also at 21 cents. Schaer was not
involved.42  1000
Elliot Maritote
55 4500t 50
Sion Schaer
36. Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926, 927 n. 1 (7th
Cir. 2000).
37. Id. at 931.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 938.
41. Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926 (7th Cir.
2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1010 (2000).
42. Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926, 928 (7th
Cir. 2000).
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2. February 26. Elliott sold 735 March-May spreads
at 10.75 cents to Maritote. Elliott bought 735 of
the same spread at the same price from Sion.
Maritote sold 735 of the same spread at the same
price to Sion. Schaer was not involved.43
735
Elliot Maritote
73>5 __- 35
Sion Schaer
3. February 27. Trading only March-May spreads at
11.5 cents, Elliott bought 1500 from Maritote, sold
2500 to Sion and then bought another 1000 from
Maritote. Maritote bought 2500 of the same
spread at the same price from Sion. Schaer was
not involved.44
1500
Elliot • MaritoteI 1000.i
2500 500
Sion Schaer
4. March 4. Elliott bought 1000 March-May spreads
at 9.5 cents from Sion, then turned around and
43. Id.
44. Id. at 928-29.
sold them to Maritote. In two separate trades,
each of 500, Maritote sold 1000 of the same
spread at the same price to Schaer. Schaer sold
them to Sion.
1000
Elliot 1 Maritote{ 1000 1000 5001 1500
Sion 4Schaer
5. March 6. Elliott bought 2500 March-May spreads
at 10.75 cents from Sion and sold them to Schaer.
Schaer sold the same quantity of the same spread
at the same price to Sion. Maritote was not
involved.46
Elliot Maritote
2500
2502500
Sion • Schaer
45. Id. at 929.
46. Id.
Fall 2002 When Dicta Attacks
474 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 22-2
6. March 7. Elliott sold 2500 March-May spreads at
10 cents to Schaer and bought the same quantity of
the same spread at the same price from Sion. Sion
bought 2500 from Schaer. Maritote was not
involved.47
Elliot Maritote
2500
2500
Sion 4 Schaer
7. March 8. Maritote bought 500 March-May
spreads at 9.5 cents from Sion and sold them to
Schaer at the same price. Elliott bought 2000
March-May spreads at 9.5 cents from Sion and
sold them to Schaer. Schaer sold all 2500, in two
trades, to Sion.48
Elliot Maritote Elliot Maritotet ,20005c 2000 50o0 O OS c
2002000 50000
0 Sion Schaer
20 2500sc 2000 E  500 m  2500 s i
Sion 4 Schaer 500m 
2000E
0 0
47. Id.
48. Id.
8. March 13. Elliott bought 1800 March-May
spreads at 8.75 cents from Schaer and sold them to
Sion. Sion sold 2600 of the same spread at the
same price to Schaer and then bought 800 back.
Maritote was not involved.49
Elliot M aritote
1800
Sion Schaer
800
As a result of these trades, on no day did any of the four experience
any net gain or loss of either money or wheat futures. 50 These facts
were undisputed.5
Before the ALJ hearing, Enforcement filed the affidavit of
Enforcement's investigator, Rooney.5 2 Rooney was a hybrid fact-
opinion witness.53 Rooney's affidavit set forth the facts as stated
above, as well as Rooney's expert opinion that these trades were
noncompetitive. 54  Rooney based his opinion on the size of the
trades, the absence of net gains or losses, the absence of the
involvement of other traders, the trade configurations, and audit trail
irregularities. 55 On cross-examination, however, Rooney conceded
that his conclusion that the trades were unfair was not based on a
rigorous statistical analysis. 56  Additionally, Petitioners were
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 930.
53. See id. at 927-31 (describing Rooney's testimony setting forth the facts of
the case and his conclusions based on the facts).
54. Id. at 929-30.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 931.
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prevented from conducting an effective cross-examination of Rooney
because many of the factual and statistical bases for his conclusions
consisted of computerized CBOT records that Rooney failed to bring
to court.
57
IV. ISSUES
A. Standard of Review
1. Prior Case Law
The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") provides that a party
that losses at the agency level of review may appeal the decision to
the appropriate court of appeals. 58  The reviewing court must
overturn any agency decision that is inconsistent with the
Constitution, statutory authority, or general principles of fairness.
5 9
57. Id.
58. 5 U.S.C. § 7123 (2001).
59. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2001). The entirety of section 706 of the APA is set
forth here for the reader's convenience:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine
the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.
The reviewing court shall-
(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or
unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by
law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case
subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or
otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or
22-2
Generally, questions of pure fact and questions of mixed fact and law
decided in formal adjudications under the APA are not reviewed
unless the reviewing court holds that the lower court acted arbitrarily
or capriciously, or abused its discretion, or lacked "substantial
evidence" for its decision. 60  "Substantial evidence is more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 6' The standard of
proof applied by an appellate court in determining whether the fact
finder below made a decision based on substantial evidence is
whether the fact finder had "enough [evidence] to prevent a judge
from directing a verdict." 62 Issues of pure fact decided in informal
adjudications are reviewed under the guidelines for review set forth
in section 706 of the APA other than subsection (2)(e); in practice,
this means that questions of fact are usually reviewed only when the
agency has acted arbitrarily or capriciously. 63 Issues of pure law are
reviewed de novo.
64
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the
facts are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing
court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2001). The Elliott case is concerned primarily with (2)(F) of
section 706.
60. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(E) (2001); see also Bateman v. United States
Dep't of Commerce, 768 F. Supp. 805, 806 (S.D. Ha. 1991).
61. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 217 (1938) (citation omitted).
62. See NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1961).
[E]vidence is substantial if it is enough to justify, if the trial were to a
jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn
from it is one of fact for the jury, and our rulings as to review of
credibility conform to that test. Applying those rulings, we cannot say that
[the testimony given] was hopelessly incredible or beyond the power of
demeanor evidence to satisfy any doubts raised by the words; and their
testimony alone would go a long way, if not, indeed, all the way, needed
to support the finding of ratification.
Id.
63. See CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE §
12.2113] (2d ed. 2001).
64. Id.
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The first step in a standard of review analysis is determining the
type of question presented. Historically, appellate courts have varied
in the extent to which they went to reframe the question in order to
review the issue.
65
Prior to its decision in Elliott, the Seventh Circuit issued several
opinions in cases to which the CF-IC was party on standard of review
issues. 66 In LaCrosse v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
the court held that the court will disturb factual determinations only
when they are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 67 The
court added that it applies a deferential standard questions involving
the agency's expertise, so long as the decision is reasonable. 68 In
Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the court stated
that the findings of an agency that ran counter to those of the ALJ in
the case would receive less weight than such findings would
normally receive. 69 In Cox v. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, the court reiterated its findings in LaCrosse and Ryan. 7 o
65. As Judge Friendly wrote in Marcus Trucking:
Neither is this doctrine with respect to inferences limited to inferences
from evidentiary facts to the fact made determinative by the statute rather
than, as here, to an intermediate fact without statutory significance in
itself; even as to matters not requiring expertise a court may not displace
the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the
court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been
before it. We are told again that other circuits have been less self-denying
in this matter of reviewing inferences, sometimes by resort to what is
called the important qualification that the reviewing court may substitute
its judgment if it chooses to turn the question of inference into a question
of law.
Marcus Trucking, 286 F.2d at 592 (citations omitted).
66. See Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 145 F.3d 910 (7th Cir.
1998); Cox v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 138 F.3d 268 (7th Cir. 1998);
LaCrosse v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 137 F.3d 925 (7th Cir. 1998).
67. LaCrosse, 137 F.3d at 929.
68. Id.
69. Ryan, 145 F.3d at 916.
70. See Cox, 138 F.3d 268.
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2. Analysis of Issue in Elliott
a. Sufficiency of Evidence
As discussed in the section below discussing the evidence issues
in Elliot, the underlying facts in the controversy were undisputed.7
The Petitioners' liability rested entirely on the inference drawn from
the facts.72  In the AU hearing, Enforcement presented an expert
witness, Rooney, who presented both the undisputed facts and his
opinion based on the circumstantial evidence. 3 Petitioners were
unable to cross-examine Rooney regarding the basis of his inferences
(e.g., lack of profits implies illicit trading practices) because Rooney
was unable to present reasons and did not bring the computer
printouts underlying his assertions to trial.74
On appeal, the primary issue was standard of review. 75
Petitioners framed the question as one of sufficiency of evidence.76
As noted above, appeals courts review sufficiency of evidence cases
de novo. The court noted that even though only circumstantial
evidence was presented, the CFTC could still meet its burden.77 The
court stated that the CFTC must do more than present circumstantial
71. See infra notes 115-171 and accompanying text; see also Elliott v.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926, 930 (7th Cir. 2000).
72. Id. at 927.
73. Id. at 927-31
74. Id. at 930-3 1.
75. See id. Although the court discussed the evidence issues in detail and the
trading practices issue in somewhat less detail, the case turned on standard of
review.
76. Id. at 931.
77. Id. (citing In re Buckwalter, [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 24,995 at 37,684 (CFTC Jan. 25, 1991)). In Buckwalter, the
Commission held that "[r]eliable circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, it is
the only evidence that is likely to exist in most cases." Id. at 931 n.34 (citing c.f
Michelman v. Clark-Schwebel Fiber Glass Corp., 534 F.2d 1036, 1043 (2d Cir.
1976)).
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evidence and claim that the circumstances indicated wrongdoing.78
The CFTC must establish that the circumstantial evidence renders the
fact of wrongdoing "more likely than not. ' 7 9  The court quotes
Abrams, which states, "[i]f both innocent and culpable inferences are
equally supported by the record, the [CFFC] fails in its burden of
proof.",80  The court goes on to state that "[e]vidence of unusual
trading patterns, like that presented here, commonly gives rise to an
inference of culpability." 8'
The Seventh Circuit failed to analyze the evidence presented in
Elliott.82  Although the court cited law supporting the idea that
circumstantial evidence must be presented in conjunction with
evidence supporting inferences drawn from the circumstantial
evidence, the court did not examine whether, in this case, the
evidence presented to support the inferences, that is, whether
Rooney's expert testimony, established Petitioners' liability by a
preponderance of the evidence. 83  Additionally, the court did not
analyze Petitioners' request that the question be framed as one of
sufficiency of evidence or even state that the court would not
consider the question as one of sufficiency of evidence.
84
Had the court examined the issue of sufficiency of evidence,
given the court's later criticism (as dicta) of the admission of
Rooney's expert testimony, it seems unlikely that the court would
have found the evidence sufficient. As discussed in the evidence
section below, the court stated that, "[h]ad the petitioners sustained
78. Id. at at 931 (quoting In re Rousso, [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm.
Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 27,133 at 45,308 (CFTC Aug. 20, 1997)).
79. Id.
80. Id. (quoting In re Abrams, [1994-1996 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L.
Rep. (CCH) 26,479 at 43,136 (CFTC July 31, 1995)).
81. Id. at 931-32 (citing In re Reddy, [1996-1998 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) 27,271 at 45,308 (CFTC Feb. 4, 1998); In re Rousso, [1996-1998
Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 27,133 at 45,308 (CFTC Aug. 20,
1997); In re Bear Steams & Co., [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 24,994 at 37,663-64 (CFTC Jan. 25, 1991)).
82. See id. at 931-33.
83. Id.
84. Id.
22-2
their attack [on the admissibility of Rooney's testimony] and
properly challenged the ALJ's decision to admit Rooney's opinion
testimony, we might have been inclined to agree with them."85 The
court then analyzed, in detail, why Rooney's testimony would not be
admissible. 86 In light of the court's analysis, the court's discounting
Rooney's testimony, and the Enforcement's failure to present other
evidence to establish the inference of wrongdoing, it is odd that the
court apparently found the evidence to be sufficient.8 7 Indeed, it is
odd that in evaluating the Petitioners' argument that the court review
the case de novo for sufficiency of evidence, the only mention the
court made of the instant case was to state the bald fact that the
Petitioners asked for sufficiency of evidence review.8 8 The court
adequately and correctly cited the law. 89 The court analyzed the
facts. 90 It is not clear why the court failed to apply its analysis of the
law to its analysis of the facts.
b. Expertise of CFTC
The court stated that "two standards of review can apply to
appeals from the CFTC." 91 If the question presented is something
courts normally hear, review is de novo.9 2 If the question presented
is within the unique expertise of the CFTC and not something with
which the circuit court is familiar, review is deferential, and the
circuit court must find for the CFTC so long as its holding is
reasonable. 93 The court stated that even if the issue is within the
85. Id. at 933 (emphasis in the original); see also infra notes 136-148 and
accompanying text.
86. Id. at 933-38.
87. Id. at 938
88. Id. at 931.
89. Id. at 931-32.
90. Id. at 933-38; see also infra notes 115-171 and accompanying text.
91. Id. at 932.
92. Id. (quoting Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 145 F.3d 910,
916 (7th Cir. 1998)).
93. Id. (citing Cox v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 138 F.3d 268,
271-72 (7th Cir. 1998); LaCrosse v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 137
F.3d 925, 929 (7th Cir. 1998)).
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expertise of the CFTC, "[w]hen the agency diet is food for the courts
on a regular basis, there is little reason for judges to subordinate their
own competence to administrative 'expertness."' 94 The court noted
that it routinely exercises plenary review over common law issues,
but that the court defers to the CFTC on "determinations of the
evidence necessary to prove violations of various sections of the
Commodity Exchange Act [and CFTC rules]. 95
The court stated that it "believe[s] the deferential standard applies
here." 96 The court stated that determining what evidence supports
the inference of trading impropriety is "peculiarly within the CFFC's
area of expertise."97 In support, the court quoted Ryan: "[N]either a
criminal jury nor the Seventh Circuit, however authoritative their
declarations, can claim expertise in the conduct of trading at the
CBOT . . . . [T]he Commission [is] certainly an expert in matters
relating to trading .... *"98 The court stated that although it regularly
dealt with sufficiency of evidence questions, it does not regularly
deal with trading practice questions.99 The court said that it was
unable to locate any published opinion in which a federal court
analyzed a particular set of circumstances supporting an inference of
trading infractions.' 00 The court noted that the CFTC regularly
examines circumstantial evidence giving rise to a trading
infraction.' 0' The court then deferred to the CFTC. 102
The court stated that the CFTC's decision "passes muster" under the
court's analysis.' 0 3 The court reviewed in detail the circumstantial
evidence examined by the CFTC and discussed in the CFTC's
opinion. 0
4
94. Id. (quoting Hi-Craft Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 915 (3d Cir.
1981)).
95. Id. (citation omitted).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Ryan, 145 F.3d at 923, (Cudahy, J., concurring)).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 932-33.
103. Id. at 933.
104. Id.
The court's analysis of the evidence examined and analyzed by
the CFTC makes little sense in light of the court's assertion that it
applied deferential review. An examination of the evidence and
discussion of whether the CFTC duly weighed the evidence is
appropriate to a sufficiency of the evidence review.'0 5 Having ruled
that it would apply a deferential standard, the court should have
stopped its analysis after it discussed the CFTC's "peculiar expertise"
in weighing the evidence supporting an inference of trading
infractions. Although the court clearly stated that it intended to apply
a deferential reasonableness standard, 10 6 the court also applied a
cursory, undeclared sufficiency test.'0 7 Ironically, in the following
section of its opinion, the court then turned around and attacked the
evidence that it had just found sufficient.' 0 8
The court did not provide reasoning to support the idea that the
evidence questions in this case were not within the plenary review of
the circuit court. 0 9 Instead, the court quoted Ryan referring to
"expertise in the conduct of trading."' 10 "Conduct of trading" is not
the same as "evidence of the conduct of trading." For example, a
videotape of pit activity would be "evidence of the conduct of
trading." What the videotape shows is "conduct of trading."
Admissibility of the videotape, similar to admissibility of any video
tape, would be well within the knowledge of federal courts.
Application of commodities law to the events portrayed by the
videotape is closer to that which would be within the "peculiar
expertise" of the CFTC. Whether the videotape is admissible and
105. See, e.g., Apache Trading Corp. v. Toub, 816 F.2d 605 (11 th Cir. 1987)
(listing all the evidence considered by the Commission in a case reviewed by the
circuit court for sufficiency of evidence).
106. Elliott, 202 F.3d at 932 (stating "[w]e believe the deferential standard
applies here.").
107. See id. at 933.
108. See id. at sections III-IV.
109. See id. at 932.
110. Id.
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whether the videotape shows the basic facts that the CFTC alleges it
shows are "food for the court on a regular basis.""'
The court's failure to find a published opinion where a federal
court considered a particular inference of trading impropriety is
irrelevant to the issue in Elliott. In a global sense, that was the
question in Elliott. However, as the court implicitly recognizes as it
devotes nearly the remainder of its opinion to Rooney's opinion
testimony, the issue in the case was less one of whether the evidence
presented supported an inference of trading impropriety as it was one
of whether Rooney's testimony, the only evidence presented to
establish that inference, was sufficient to create the inference. In
other words, if Rooney's testimony should not have been admitted,
even though the admissibility error was not preserved, the evidence
could not be sufficient. The court's claim that it applied a deferential
standard is undercut by its sufficiency analysis.' 
12
The court did not need special expertise to examine whether
Rooney's evidence adequately established the inference that
Petitioners' trading was illicit. No special expertise was necessary to
note that Rooney's testimony rested on a foundation of knowledge
that not even Rooney could defend. Therefore, the review should
have been plenary and de novo.11 3  Beyond the question of
admissibility, the very evidence itself should have been discounted in
a de novo review.
3. Potential Impact
Elliott blurs the distinction between the different standards of
review of agency decisions and the requisite elements to establish the
appropriateness of the standards. Before Elliott, the standards were
clearer: if sufficiency of the evidence was the appropriate standard of
review, then the appellate court had to review, de novo, whether the
agency used enough evidence to support its finding. If a
reasonableness standard was appropriate, the reviewing court had to
111. See Hi-Craft Clothing Co., 660 F.2d at 915.
112. See Elliott, 202 F.3d at 932-33.
113. See id. at 932.
give the agency deference so long as the agency's finding was
reasonable. After Elliott, these standards are less clear.
Elliott's muddled reasoning has an impact not only on the
appellants but also on those who attempt to reason out the Seventh
Circuit's law of standard of review of agency decisions. Elliott's
hybrid deference/sufficiency reasoning lends more weight to Elliott's
evidence discussion. There is no question that the evidence
discussion is dicta. 14 However, the court's sufficiency rationale of a
deference holding lends more weight to the dicta about evidence than
that which dicta would otherwise carry.
B. Evidence
1. Prior Case Law
When a witness proposes to testify as to both facts and the
witness's opinion, the admissibility of each point of testimony must
be evaluated based on whether it is fact or opinion. Expert testimony
is analyzed under Daubert v. Merrell Do w Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.'"5
In Daubert, the Court established the standard for admissibility of
expert witness testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence
("Rules"). 16  Before Daubert, the standard, set forth in Frye v.
United States, was that expert opinion was admissible if it was based
on a scientific technique whose reliability was "generally accepted"
by the scientific community. 1 7 In Daubert, the Court considered the
admissibility of expert testimony regarding epidemiological analyses
of the potential side effects of the drug Bendectin." 8 The Court
noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted "half a
114. See id. at 933 ("[T]he admissibility of Rooney's testimony does not
appear to be inescapably before this court. Indeed, we doubt that the petitioners
have properly preserved the issue for appeal.").
115. See infra notes 116-135 and accompanying text.
116. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
117. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
118. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 584.
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century" after Frye. "19 The Court then attempted to reconcile the
Federal Rules with Frye, reasoning that nothing in Federal Rule of
Evidence 402 establishes the Frye standard "as an absolute
prerequisite to admissibility" and that there is no "clear indication
that Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a
'general acceptance' standard."' 120  The Court held that the Rules
"displaced" Frye.'2' The Court set forth a new standard that trial
judges must determine admissibility of expert testimony based on
"whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge
that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue."' 122 The trial judge must "ensure that.., scientific testimony.
* . is not only relevant, but reliable."' 123 The Court suggested several
methods for determining whether the information is "scientific
knowledge": (i) "whether it can be (and has been) tested"; 124 (ii)
whether the purported scientific knowledge "has been subjected to
peer review and publication"; 125 (iii) "the known or potential rate of
119. Id. at 587.
120. Id. at 588. Provided here for the reader's convenience, Federal Rule of
Evidence 402 reads: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EviD. 402.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts
of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
121. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
122. Id. at 592.
123. Id. at 589.
124. Id. at 593.
125. Id.
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error"; 126 and (iv) the old Frye "general acceptance" test.127 The
Court indicated that it intended the new test to be flexible and that
admissibility should be considered with regard to all the Rules, not
just Rule 702.128
In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, the Court refined its decision
in Daubert.129 In Kumho, the Court considered expert testimony that
was not scientific, incidentally, that of engineers. 130 Reasoning that
Rule 702 does not distinguish between "scientific knowledge" and
"technical or other specialized knowledge," the Court held
"Daubert's general holding - setting forth the trial judge's general
'gatekeeping' obligation - applies not only to testimony based on
'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based on 'technical' and
'other specialized' knowledge."'131 The Court added that the district
court judge's gatekeeping function is a discretionary authority that is
reviewable for abuse. 132  In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia
asserted that abandonment of the gatekeeping function is abuse of
discretion. 133
Prior to Elliott, Daubert and Kumho Tire had not been applied to
evidence presented in securities cases involving trading violations.
1 34
About a year after Elliott was decided, in Primavera Familienstifung
v. Askin, a Southern District of New York judge decided that Daubert
applied to an expert's price model. 1
35
126. Id. at 594.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 594-95.
129. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
130. Id. at 141.
131. Id. (citing FED. R. EvID. 702).
132. Id. at 158.
133. Id. at 158-59.
134. Searches on Westlaw did not yield any results.
135. Primavera Familienstifung v. Askin, 130 F. Supp. 2d 450, 524 (S.D.N.Y.
2001). Elliott was not cited in the Primavera Familienstifung.
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2. Analysis of Issue in Elliott
a. Rooney's Testimony
The first evidence issue would have been whether Rooney was a
qualified expert witness.' 36 Additionally, this case may establish an
evidentiary presumption that a pattern of symmetrical trades indicates
wash sales. The court addressed the evidence issues as dicta.1 37
Petitioners probably failed to preserve the error of admission of
Rooney's opinion testimony, 138 but the circuit court discussed it
anyway, stating that had the error been preserved, "[the court] might
have been inclined to agree with them."' 39 The court applied the
Daubert test to Rooney's opinion.' 40  The court stated that
Enforcement, through Rooney, presented a "numbers" case. 14  The
court found that Rooney's testimony was unreliable because Rooney
failed to present: (i) reliable statistics to support the presumption that
symmetrical trades indicated wash sales; (2) analysis of market
liquidity or trading volume or price during similar periods; (3)
evidence that freshening usually resulted in some net gain or loss; or
(4) proof that audit trail irregularities definitely indicate illegal
trading practices. 142 The court held that therefore, had the error been
preserved, the court might have held that Rooney's testimony failed
the Daubert test. 14 3 The court repeatedly emphasized that it only
136. See Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926, 931
(7th Cir. 2000).
137. Id. at 927 (deciding case on the basis of standard of review).
138. Id. at 933.
139. Id. (emphasis in original).
140. Id. at 933-34.
141. Id. at 934.
142. Id. at 933-34.
143. Id. at 933.
"might" have found Rooney's testimony inadmissible, reasoning that
as both fact finders apparently discounted the testimony, the issue
was not properly before the circuit court.
14 4
Although the ALJ ruled that Rooney's testimony was admissible,
it appeared that neither the ALJ nor the CFTC based their rulings on
Rooney's "expert" opinion testimony.' 45 The court stated that "[t]his
is an appropriate approach," because Daubert and Kumho stand for
the proposition that all expert testimony that impacts a fact finding
must be reliable. 146  The court stated that "a fact finder should
employ the reliability benchmark in situations, as here, in which
unreliable expert testimony somehow makes it in front of the fact
finder."' 147  The court assumed that Rooney's unreliable expert
testimony had not been considered by the fact finder, assumed that
the fact finders had not considered it because they found the evidence
unreliable, and held that if the ALJ erred in admitting Rooney's
expert opinion testimony, the error was harmless. 1
48
b. Circumstantial Evidence
The court's assertion that neither fact finder, including the CFTC,
considered Rooney's testimony raises again the question: if Rooney's
testimony did not support the inference of the Petitioners'
wrongdoing, what evidence did? No other evidence, circumstantial
or otherwise, was presented to support the inference. 149 The court
wrestled with this paradox, admitting, "[w]e recognize the seeming
illogic of rejecting ... Rooney's inference on the one hand ... while
endorsing . . . the Commission's on the other."' 50  The court
recognizes that "there is a cognizable difference."' 5' Consideration
144. Id. at 934.
145. ld.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 934-35.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 935.
151. Id.
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of Rooney's testimony is a purely evidentiary issue. 152 Consideration
of the CFTC's decision is not one of whether one piece of evidence
was admissible but whether sufficient evidence was presented "to
raise a strong enough inference to establish liability for a
violation."' 153
If Rooney's evidence was discounted, 154 and no other evidence of
Petitioners' liability was presented, 155 and the decision was not
completely arbitrary,' 56 then there must be some evidence to support
the idea that the Petitioners' behavior was wrong. The majority says
that it "defer[s] to the CFTC in part because of its 'expertise' or...
specialized knowledge."'' 57 The court then lists some circumstantial
evidence, but it supports the traders' allegations they were not liable
for wash sales. 158  The majority noted that the CFTC presented
evidence of an "innocent" trade that took place on the same day, but
at a different time, than some of the challenged trades. 159 The traders
claimed that no one wanted to trade with them, and although the
CFTC showed that there were other traders active on the days in
question, the CFTC did not present evidence that other traders
wanted to trade the exact same spreads at the exact same times. As
the dissent said, "[I]t is undisputed that any other trader who wanted
to participate could have done so."' 60 The majority also noted that
152. See id.
153. Id.
154. See supra notes 136-148 and accompanying text.
155. See Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926, 926
(7th Cir. 2000).
156. No matter how high the standard of review applied or supposed to be
applied, a completely arbitrary decision would have to be struck down by the
circuit court. As discussed above, the Seventh Circuit did not strike down Elliott.
It is safe to say, therefore, that the Elliott decision was not completely arbitrary.
157. Elliott, 202 F.3d at 935.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 936-37.
160. Id. at 941 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). In fact, the CFTC was unable to
find any trader who wanted to partake in Petitioners' trades: The AU found:
The few traders who were active in the
March spread during the relevant time period
did not, for the most part, trade as large a
volume as the [Petitioners]. The four
22-2
there were audit trail irregularities, that is, many of the challenged
trades were reported on the same card. 16 1 The strongest argument the
majority can summon to tie this practice to actual liability is that
reporting the transactions on the same card "is consistent with the
inference that the trades were pre-arranged. ' ' 162 Evidence that the
traders came to the exchange on the appropriate days is "consistent
with the inference that the trades were pre-arranged." Without more
evidence (e.g., evidence as to the usual use of cards or as evidence as
to the reporting of trades of the baseline "innocent" freshening
transaction), this evidence of mere audit trail irregularities is
unhelpful. Additionally, the CFTC could have, but did not, pursue
sanctions against the Petitioners for recordkeeping violations. 163
The dissent directly addressed the question of evidence when it
wrote, "Under the Administrative Procedure Act, the question now is
whether that finding is supported by substantial evidence. What
evidence might that be, given that all of the testimony other than
Rooney's favored the traders, and Rooney's is worthless?"'164 The
dissent answered its question: "The usual way to prove agreement is
co-conspirator testimony and physical evidence consistent with
private deals off the trading floor. Yet everyone in a position to know
the truth testified that there had been no private arrangement."'
165
[Petitioners] were among the "select guys
[who] trade big numbers into the delivery
game." Other potential market participants
chose to pursue different economic
opportunities. The [Petitioners] executed large
volume trades among themselves because, to
put it simply, "they were the only game in
town."
Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC
Docket No. 95-1, at *10 (Sept. 11, 1996).
161. Elliott, 202 F.3d at 937.
162. Id.
163. Elliott, CFTC Docket No. 95-1, at *8 (Sept. 11, 1996).
164. Elliott, 202 F.3d at 940 (citations omitted) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
The dissent correctly describes the standard of review actually applied by the
majority - sufficiency of evidence.
165. Id. (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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In Elliott, assuming that the Seventh Circuit was correct in stating
that the ALJ and the CFTC did not consider Rooney's unreliable
expert testimony in making their findings, the only remaining
evidence is the symmetry of the trades.' 66 Therefore, by inference,
this case tends to establish an evidentiary presumption that
symmetrical trades indicate wash sales. The dissent hints at this
when it said, "Do we then use the observed behavior - consistent
with [wash sales] - to infer agreement and forbid the conduct?"'167
The dissent further stated:
The CFTC simply assumed that if given conduct
would be unusual unless either (a) agreement had
been reached, or (b) small numbers produce
interdependence, then explanation (a) must be the
right one even in a small-numbers case. It did not
attempt to grapple with traders' interdependence, the
parallel to antitrust law, the holding of Stoller, or any
related issue, and Chenery forbids us to fill those
gaps. 168
Taken as a whole, these analyses stand for the idea that
circumstantial evidence on its own, without expert testimony to
explain the circumstantial evidence, may establish scienter for wash
sales where the trier of fact interprets the circumstantial evidence to
establish wrongdoing. Perhaps most interesting about this idea is that
it is precisely the opposite conclusion as that presented in Stoller. 169
3. Analysis and Potential Impact
By casually affirming an opinion based on very little evidence, all
of it circumstantial, and the interpretation of those circumstances in
doubt, the Seventh Circuit leads the author to wonder when Rules
166. See id. at 926.
167. Id. at 944 (emphasis in the original).
168. Id. (emphasis in the original).
169. See infra notes 178-90 and accompanying text.
402 and 702 would apply. 170 If, as Justice Scalia suggested in his
dissent to Kumho, a trial judge's total abandonment of his
gatekeeping function is grounds to overturn or remand a decision
based on abuse of discretion, it is very difficult to understand why the
Seventh Circuit, having aptly analyzed Rooney's testimony under
Daubert and Kumho, would not overturn or remand Elliott for abuse
of discretion. Failing to overturn or remand Elliott or to say that it
would have overturned or remanded, as opposed to "we might have
been inclined...,,171 implies that the gatekeeper function is optional.
In this case, the ALJ wore two hats: fact finder and law finder. It
is difficult to determine whether the ALJ didn't use Rooney's
testimony because it was not reliable or because it was unneeded.
The error in this case might be harmless, but the error in general is
not: this case opens the door to presenting all the unreliable evidence
one chooses in a bench trial, evidence that ought not to be admitted
based on relevancy rules, predicated on the idea that the judge will
figure out later what is relevant and/or admissible. In essence, the
judge can then decide what outcome he likes, then decide to admit
evidence based on whether it supports that outcome. Although this is
always a danger in bench trials, it becomes a greater danger when the
judge isn't called upon to make determinations of relevancy or
reliability as the evidence is presented.
Additionally, allowing uninterpreted, unexplained circumstantial
evidence to serve as the only evidence required for a finding of
liability not only fails to provide a guide to future courts and tribunals
attempting to sort through the Elliott holding but also creates a
mechanism for a trier of fact to arbitrarily decide on an outcome
notwithstanding the evidence presented or to make an uninformed
decision if the trier of fact is not familiar with the type of evidence
presented. As the dicta giving rise to this concept discusses the
standard of review and evidence, the issues on which the Seventh
Circuit based its opinion, not wash sales specifically, which the
170. FED. R. EviD. 402 and 702.
171. Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926, 933 (7th
Cir. 2000).
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Seventh Circuit did not use to ground its opinion, the dicta regarding
hybrid expert-fact witness testimony might have widespread effect.
Establishing evidentiary presumptions by inference instead of
explicit statement leads to chaos in legal arguments. It would be as
difficult to base an entire cause of action on similar evidence using
this de facto evidentiary presumption as it would be to argue that the
case should not apply in similar circumstances. Also, without an
explicit statement, the presumption has no boundaries, limits, or
requirements. This issue will certainly be revisited in future
proceedings and trials and therefore, the presumption will be refined
or destroyed. However, the fact that future courts will have to revisit
this issue leads to judicial inefficiency.
C. Wash Sales
1. Prior Case Law
In 1948, the Commodity Exchange Authority ("CEA"), the
predecessor organization to the CFTC, described a wash sale as one
in which "the intent [of the traders was] not to make a genuine bona
fide trading transaction in stocks or commodities."1 7 2  The CEA
issued a memorandum indicating it considered the practice that
would come to be known as freshening to be a wash sale. 73 The
memo was "not published as an interpretive release" but as an
accompaniment to the Goldwurm decision. 174 In 1959, the CEA
repeated its position to the brokers, but not the general public. 71 In
1955, the CEA again stated its position in an internal
memorandum. 176 In 1971, the CEA repeated this same position to
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 177 None of these documents were
published to the general public, and "the policy apparently remained
172. Goldwurm, 7 Agri. Dec. 265 (C.E.A. 1948).
173. Stoller v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 834 F.2d 262, 265 (2d
Cir. 1987).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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unenforced for years and the allegedly proscribed conduct apparently
remained commonplace."1 78
In 1986, the CFTC brought an action for wash sales used to
freshen in Collins.179 The CFTC alleged that Manning Stoller, a
trader associated with Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc.,
committed wash sales when he freshened positions in May 1976
potato futures.' 80  The CFTC found that the CEA's position that
freshening was a wash sale was clearly stated in Goldwurm,'81 and
therefore, Stoller was found to have committed wash sales. 182
In Stoller v. Commodity Trading Futures Commission, the
Second Circuit court ruled that mere transaction symmetry does not
create a presumption of wash sales.1 83 Stoller appealed the CFIC's
decision in Collins. 184 There was no other evidence of collusion, and
Stoller was the sole defendant.' 85 After Collins, but before Stoller,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Curran showed that in
May 1976, an illegal conspiracy depressed the price of potato
futures.' 86 Stoller was not involved in this conspiracy. 187
The Second Circuit reasoned that:
An agency is free, of course, to interpret its
governing statute case by case through adjudicatory
proceedings rather than by rulemaking. . . . In so
doing, it may "announc[e] and apply [ ] a new
178. Id.
179. See In re Collins, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 22,982 (Apr. 4, 1986),
overturned sub nom. Stoller, 834 F.2d at 262.
180. Id. at 31,898.
181. Id. at 31,899.
182. Id. at 31,903.
183. Stoller, 834 F.2d at 262.
184. Id. at 263.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 263 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353 (1982)).
187. Id.
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standard of conduct." . . . However, if the
Commission suddenly changes its view, as we discuss
below, with respect to what transactions are "bona
fide trading transactions," it may not charge a
knowing violation of that revised standard and
thereby cause undue prejudice to a litigant who may
have relied on the agency's prior policy or
interpretation. 188
The Second Circuit observed that neither the CEA nor the CFFC had
ever pursued an action for freshening.1 89 The court held that Stoller,
in common with the general public, did not have adequate knowledge
that the CFTC would seek sanctions against traders who transacted
wash sales.' 90 The Second Circuit held that the fact that Stoller may
not have incurred a great deal of risk in the transactions was not
enough to hold that Stoller engaged in wash sales, particularly in
view of the CFFC's failure to adequately alert the public to the
change in policy. 191
2. Discussion of the Effect of Elliott on the Law Regarding
Freshening Trades
The Seventh Circuit majority did not address the wash sale
question.' 9 2 The ALJ, the dissent and General Counsel for CBOT
writing as amicus did, however. 193
The ALJ warned, "[ruling in favor of the CFIC] would function
as a de facto ban on the freshening of a position by means of a day
188. Id. at 265-66 (citations omitted).
189. Id. at 266.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 267. "The Commission may well have the power to construe the
statute in such a subtle and refined way, but the public may not be held accountable
under this construction without some appropriate notice." Id. (citation omitted).
192. See Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926, 926-
938 (7th Cir. 2000).
193. See id. at 938-39 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Chicago Board of Trade, Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d
926 (7th Cir. 2000) (No. 98-1305) [hereinafter Seventh Circuit Amicus Brief].
trade. . . . No trader is ever going to freshen a position if he risks
liability should the freshening not occur under [CFTC sanctioned
conditions]. ' 194
Concerned that the CFTC's decision would "have the unintended
consequence of imposing a de facto ban on . . . freshening," the
CBOT submitted an amicus brief on behalf of Petitioners. 195 The
CBOT sought to educate the Seventh Circuit on the issue of
freshening.19 6  The CBOT noted that Rooney testified that
'freshening . . . is a legitimate means to decrease or delay the
physical delivery of a cash commodity .. . [and] has a legitimate
economic purpose.' 197 The CBOT argued that freshening is an
economic requisite to a liquid market. 198 The CBOT went on to
argue that freshening, in and of itself, is not evidence of an intention
to take the risk out of trading.' 99 The CBOT then argued that the
CFTC's decision effectively banned freshening trades without
properly doing so through rulemaking or adequate interpretive
notification.2 °°
Not all symmetrical trades are wash sales. For example, suppose
an individual sells a stock at a certain price. The stock price goes up.
The individual wishes to get back in the market and executes a buy
order (not a buy limit order). The market goes down again before the
broker and/or market maker can effect the trade, and the buyer ends
up buying in again at the same price at which he sold. The trade is
symmetrical, but there is no pre-arrangement or intention to remove
risk from the transaction. The scienter element of an illegal wash
sale would have addressed this instance of accidental symmetrical
trading.
194. Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n , CFTC Docket No. 95-1,
at *8 (Sept. 11, 1996).
195. Seventh Circuit Amicus Brief, supra note 193, at 2.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 5-6.
198. Id. at 7.
199. Id. at 8.
200. Id. at 9-14.
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After Elliott, the need to show scienter is in doubt. Even if there
were sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the Seventh
Circuit's decision, there was very little circumstantial evidence that
supported a finding of scienter.2" As the CBOT stated,
Given the fact that the [CFrC] has conceded that
freshening is a legitimate trading strategy, it has sent
inconsistent signals to the trading community by its
determination that the absence of any profit or loss
supports a conclusion that trades have not been
competitively executed. A trader's desire to freshen
with minimal loss, and his success in executing the
sale and purchase at the same price, should not lead to
an inference that he engaged in a noncompetitive
transaction.2 °2
As another example, suppose a commodity trader wishes to
freshen. The price of the commodity is so stable that it does not
change. The trader has conducts a symmetrical transaction, but the
trade is not pre-arranged or risk-free, so it is not a wash sale. This
scenario is very close to the facts of both Stoller and Elliott, except
that rather than being a stable market generally, the price was stable
at the volume of trading of the defendants. In a thinly traded
commodity, in order to freshen, it is entirely possible that a trader
would use a symmetrical trade to accomplish freshening.2 °3
Additionally, if the trader needed to freshen a very large number of
contracts, even in a heavily traded commodity, the market for large
trades might be thin, that is, despite there being hundreds of traders in
a pit, only three or four others hold positions large enough to transact
the freshening trade.20 4
The de facto outcome of Elliott is that high volume traders or
traders in thinly-traded commodities who wish to stay in the market
201. See Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926 (7th
Cir. 2000). Only the fact that some of the allegedly illicit trades were reported on
the same card supports a finding of scienter.
202. Seventh Circuit Amicus Brief, supra note 193, at 9-10.
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., Elliott, CFTC Docket 95-1, at *10 (Sept. 11, 1996).
22-2
in order to maximize profits are forced to choose on which horn of
the dilemma to impale themselves. They can either transact a
freshening trade that happens to be a wash sale, but for which the
necessary scienter for a wash sale is absent, and hope that the agency
or a self-regulatory organization will not use the potential implied
evidentiary presumption to nail the trader for transacting a wash sale
or they can stay in the market with the old position and bear
unnecessary risk of taking delivery - unnecessary because freshening
is a legitimate practice, one that could be used by a smaller volume
trader or a trader in a more heavily traded commodity. Commodity
trading is risky, however, that is not at issue. What is at issue is
whether commodity trading should be more risky based on the
volume traded, not simply because more money is at risk, but
because the rules, de facto, are different because of the relative rarity
of high volume traders at a particular time.
V. CONCLUSION
In Elliott, the Seventh Circuit stated that two standards of review
could apply to appeals from administrative agencies.2 °5  If the
question presented is one that courts normally encounter, then the
standard of review is de novo.206 If the question presented is one that
is within the peculiar expertise of the administrative agency, then a
deferential standard must be applied.20 7
The Seventh Circuit first claimed that the case involved issues
within the peculiar expertise of the CFTC, that is, wash sales and
evidence thereof.20 8 It used this claim to decline to hand down a
legal opinion on the merits of the appellants' case. 209 The court then
discussed the very issues it claimed it lacked expertise to discuss.210
205. Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 202 F.3d 926, 932 (7th
Cir. 2000).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 932-938.
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It is not so much that the Seventh Circuit wanted to have its cake and
eat it as much as it is the court wanted to disclaim all interest in the
cake but eat it anyway.
Bad facts make bad law. This case proves this maxim in several
ways. The evidence was insufficient to prove Enforcement's
assertions. The opinion from the AM left unclear on what evidence
the ALJ based his decision.211 The majority's opinion easily disposes
of the case, but this easy disposal has disastrous implications. The
case fails to resolve whether an evidentiary presumption that trade
symmetry implies wash sales, and in addressing the issue as mere
dicta, fails to create an issue that the Supreme Court might address.
The Supreme Court grants certiorari for circuit court splits. Here,
there is effectively a circuit court split with regard to wash sales, but
as the majority's decision rests solely on standard of review, and
secondarily (and debatably) on admissibility of expert witness
testimony, the circuit court split does not officially exist. The dicta
is, of course, just dicta, but the majority of the opinion is dicta, and
the dicta is far better reasoned than the finding of law. The result is a
thoroughly reasoned case that is useless except when it is dangerous.
211. See generally Elliott v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n , CFTC
Docket 95-1 (Sept. 11, 1996).
